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THE great architect is one who knows how to create a structure that com-
bines the useful and the beautiful. The great legal theorist, the architect of
doctrinal structure, should do no less. Although the primary object should
be to mold and synthesize the fragments as they come from the courts into
a system of doctrine that can be used to achieve desirable social ends, yet it
can not be denied that there is a place for legal aesthetics. Any kind of legal
work, however excellent in other respects, will suffer if orderly arrangement,
good grammar or correct spelling are lacking. A body of law, though nicely
calculated to serve the ends of justice, leaves something to be desired if it
abounds in unsightly anomalies, piles exception upon exception, or is other-
wise lacking in unity and coherence.
The serviceable and harmonious in all realms frequently, perhaps normally,
go hand in hand, and each contributes to the other. But not always. Also
at times there are conflicts, so that it becomes necessary to make a choice.
What are the relative values of utility and symmetry in the field of law?
Shall we tolerate occasional injustice for the sake of the symmetry of the
legal structure or shall we endure the blemish of a concept if in some appli-
cations it fails to yield an acceptable result? Voices to which we are all dis-
posed to listen have been heard on the issue.
CARDozo: "Concepts are useful, indeed indispensable, if kept within
their place. We will press them quite a distance. Many a time they
will give rise to rules which might just as well be opposite were it
not that in giving adherence to the opposite we would mutilate the
symmetry of the legal order, the relation of its parts, its logical
coherence. These are values deeply imbedded in our law. and its
philosophy . . . A time comes, however, when the concepts carry
us too far."'
POUND: "Law is not scientific for the sake of science. Being scien-
tific as a means toward an end, it must be judged by the results it
achieves, not by the niceties of its internal structure; it must be
valued by the extent to which it meets its end, not by the beauty of
its logical processes or the strictness with which its rules proceed
from the dogmas it takes for its foundation. ' 2
1. PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE (1928) 62-63.
2. Mechanical Jurisprudence (1908) 8 CoL. L. R-v. 605.
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Professor Williston is generally recognized as one of the great architects
of the law. Llewellyn in the dedication of his Sales casebook has referred to
him as "the master and the builder of our law of sales." No less is he the
master and the builder of our law of contracts. Yet there have been times
when I have felt that he has pressed a concept too far, that his emphasis on
the nicety of internal structure has led to the undue subordination of practical
ends, that in rare moments at least he has lost sight of the fact that the law
of contracts was made for man, not man for the law of contracts.
An example of such overemphasis on the symmetrical is to be found in
the treatment of reward cases. The learned author insists that all the services
for which a reward is offered must be rendered after knowledge of the offer,
in order to justify a recovery. That one who communicates with the police
before learning of the offered reward thereby disqualifies himself from ever
gaining a legal right to it, or any part of it, is contrary to the sense of justice
of most people, and the majority of cases, where the problem has arisen, are
opposed to such a view. But Williston says these cases are unsound and the
only support he adduces for his position is a highly unreal supposititious case
involving a Christmas present, which he says is the same on principle.3 To
this supposititious situation the reader is supposed to react in the opposite
way. Therefore the effect of the reasoning is that in order to do justice to
the mythical receiver of a Christmas gift, the principle must be preserved
that the whole consideration must be given after knowledge of the offer, no
matter what the injustice to actual persons who give information leading to
the solution of crimes.
Again there is criticism in the treatise of the obviously sensible practice
followed by most courts of dividing up rewards where several persons, though
acting independently, have contributed to the accomplishment for which the
reward was offered. 4 This also in the name of "principle." The truth is that
principles of law developed largely for the commercial world simply do not
work well in this little corner of affairs. But I would have no objection-
and I do not see why anyone other than a legal Bunthorne should object-
to letting the law of rewards have its own little anomalous wing in the house
of contracts.
Let me hasten to add, however, that the kind of reasoning referred to above
is not typical of the treatise. Most of the argument proceeds on quite a
different level. Practical considerations are taken into account. Even the
plea for what the author calls "respect for logic" is made on the ground that
such respect alone makes possible the settlement of controversies without
recourse to the courts. And "practical convenience is more important than
logical exactness," but such considerations "must be very weighty to justify
infringing the underlying principles of the law of contracts."s One may
question the possibility or desirability of stifling litigation by "logical exact-
ness" 6 and the pertinency of the thought as it relates to the argument against




6. See my review of Morris, How Lawyers Thinik (1937) 32 Iu. L REv. 383, 384.
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proach indicates no blind following of traditional "principle." Indeed with a
greater or less degree of articulateness, principles are constantly evaluated in
the light of administrative and social policy and the reaction of the average
man to the results of their application. The view that a promise may be
supported by a promissory estoppel is guardedly accepted with a minimum
of historical argument, 7 although prior to the Restatement it was hardly
looked upon as respectable, and after the Restatement Pollock at least regarded
the doctrine as highly anomalous. 8 Professor Williston also espouses the
view that an offer for a unilateral contract becomes irrevocable before accept-
ance if there is part performance,9 in spite of the violence done to the general
principle that offers are revocable.
Although in some instances Professor Williston has looked with favor on
the mutilation of basic dogma by the ingrafting of new principles or the carving
out of exceptions in the interest of justice or practical convenience, he has
nevertheless, regardless of the social or moral considerations involved, re-
mained adamant in refusing to look with equanimity on what he would doubt-
less think of as the torture of a concept to make it apply to a given situation.
Once a principle or rule is established, there is no countenancing of any play
at the joints. For example, he deplores the enforcement of charitable sub-
scriptions either on the theory of mutual promises by subscribers for the
benefit of the charitable institution or on the theory of a counter-promise by
the institution to apply the amounts to be received for a stated purpose. 10
Implicitly the loose use of theories such as these is attributed to judicial
stupidity or perversity. Seldom is there indicated any appreciation of the
fact that concept wrenching is often due to social drives such as those which
Billig has suggested may account for the state of the law of charitable sub-
scriptions.'1
Professor Williston has thus had a stabilizing influence on the law of
contracts. Legal progress through the expansion of concepts has met with
his constant opposition. Yet he is a conservative only in the sense in which
Holmes was a liberal. His views on social questions are seldom ascertainable,
for these he deemed irrelevant to his task. Such expressions as we have,
however, mark him as at least mildly liberal in his social outlook.12 What
may pass for conservatism is actually austerity. In other words, his is a
conservatism that is essentially intellectual, but only a little less stifling to
progress on that account.
Whatever one may think of the philosophy underlying the treatise, it is
clear that its discussions make an appeal to the legal craftsman. It is now
trite to say that it is one of the real masterpieces of American legal writing.
For seventeen years judges, practitioners and law teachers have found in the
7. § 139.
8. Pollock, Book Review (1933) 47 HARV. L. REv. 363, 365.
9. §§ 60, 60A.
10. § 116.
11. Thw Problem of Consderation in Charitable Subscriptions (1927) 12 Co.N. L,
Q. 467; SELECThD READINGS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1931) 542.
12. See Freedom of Contract (1921) 6 CoRN. L. Q. 365; SEc'rTD READINGS ON THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS (1931) 100.
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first edition the most reliable answers to many of their questions and stimula-
tion as well as quotation for the development of their legal arguments. The
new edition differs from the first only in that it is more complete, more
accurate, and covers many new developments since 1920. A wealth of material
has been added to the footnotes and many additional sections have been inter-
spersed. No doubt much of the credit for the additions is due to the co-author
of the revision, Professor Thompson.
The errors in the first edition needing correction were surprisingly few
considering the broad scope of the subjects covered. An example of an im-
provement in the interest of accuracy is to be found in the sections dealing
with the cancellation of mutual debts. The material contained in the first
edition 13 now appears with considerable elaboration1 in a new chapter en-
titled "Conditions Implied in Fact and Independent Duties." In dealing with
the effect of non-payment of an installment of the price in a divisible sales
contract when the seller defaults in deliveries, the first edition stated that the
buyer may not refuse payment because of a later default by the seller. The
real problem, however, arises in the case of a prior default, and some of the
cases cited held that such a default had no effect on the buyer's obligation.
The new edition changes the word "later" to "previous." The first edition
unduly minimized contrary authority, and gave an erroneous notion of the
Illinois view, which is to the effect that the obligation to pay is excused if
the damages for the seller's breach exceed the payment due and the buyer
offers to release the damages to that amount. In the second edition the
authorities on this point are accurately stated.
A number of the more than one hundred and thirty new sections are
devoted to exposition of Restatement rules.15 Notable among the others are
those containing discussions of new developmerits in the law relating to letters
of credit 16 and bankruptcy.' 7 The six meager sections of the first edition
on commercial arbitration have been expanded into a new chapter containing
eighteen sections.18 This chapter reflects many of the views of 'r. Philip
G. Phillips, whose assistance is acknowledged in a footnote. A remarkably
large amount of material is presented in brief compass with excellent critical
comment, although some of the author's objections to the extension of arbitra-
tion are based more on a theory than on actual conditions, and the attempted
sharp distinction between commercial and industrial arbitrations tends to
minimize elements that are common to both procedures.
Even an eight volume treatise, when it covers so broad a field, has its
limitations. A topic of such vast and increasing importance as the enforce-
ment of collective labor agreements is covered in a little more than two pages,'0
although it should be stated that collective bargaining and other labor problems
13. § 859.
14. §§ 887E-887G.
15. §§ 1A, 2A, 57A, 60A, 103G, 140, 440A, 445A, 1516A.
16. §§ 1011A-1011E.
17. §§ 1982A-1982C, 1998A-1998D, 2000A-2000C.
18. Chap. LVII.
19. §§ 379A, 1423A.
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are dealt with elsewhere. Requirement and output contracts 20 and the em-
ployee's bonus21 doubtless receive as much space as can be afforded in a
treatise. But the treatment of these subjects as well as the material on col-
lective labor agreements is most inadequate, because each is included in a
chapter devoted to a single doctrine and the discussion is confined to the
application of that doctrine. Thus cases on the employee's bonus, covered
in the consideration chapter, raise questions not only of consideration, but
of offer and acceptance, conditions, statute of frauds, and certainty of terms.
Collective labor agreements raise many problems other than that of the
application of the third party beneficiary doctrine. On the other hand the
inclusion of the subjects of real estate brokers' compensation 22 and exclusive
sales agencies 23 in the chapter on contracts of employment has permitted a
fuller treatment.
The interpretation of more or less standard provisions in contracts seems
to come within the subject of the treatise. Although a number of common
types of clauses are discussed in the new edition, as for example, satisfaction
clauses, 24 it is probable that even an eight volume treatise could not cover
very many of them. Some additional room for other subjects might have
been made by curtailing the material on risk of loss in real estate contracts.
This pet subject of the author received an inordinate amount of space in the
first edition, yet it has been expanded in the new edition from forty-one to
fifty-three pages.25
In closing I relate an incident that on its face may be thought to interject
an inappropriate note of frivolity. But its point is a serious one, and with that
explanation I risk it. Once I was going over the case of Allegheny College
v. National Chautauqua County Bank20 with my Contracts class. We came
to the language of the court, "' . . . though professing to apply to . . .
(charitable) subscriptions the general law of contract, we have found con-
sideration present where the general law of contract . . .would have said
that it was absent." In a spirit of mild protest at the figure of speech I
inquired, "Who is 'the general law of contract?'" As I look back I suppose
the reply was obvious. With one accord the class responded, "Williston I"
And there was merit in the answer, not only because the professor had said
in his treatise exactly what the learned judge put into the mouth of the
abstraction, but because Professor Williston, as no other individual, does
personify the American law of contracts.
HAROLD C. HAviGl1URSrt
Chicago, Illinois






26. 246 N. Y. 369, 159 N.E. 173 (1927).
t Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
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ANNOTATIONS ON SMALL LOAN LAWS. Small Loan Series. By F. B. Huba-
chek. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1938. Pp. lxv, 255.
TnuE preface states that "this is essentially a legal reference book." As such,
it is competent and complete. It provides information as to all American
statutes and decisions concerning the regulation of the small loan business.
After general annotations dealing with the purpose and interpretation of the
statutes and the cases involving their constitutionality, it proceeds to sectional
annotations of the Sixth, or latest, Draft of the Uniform Small Loan Law,
sponsored by the Department of Remedial Loans of the Russell Sage Founda-
tion. The annotations give the state laws and decisions on the points covered
by the twenty-seven sections of the uniform law. Thereafter follow a dis-
cussion of devices and methods used to evade statutory interest limitations,
together with the relevant provisions of the uniform law controlling such
evasions, then appendices containing drafts of acts, citations of cases, a bibli-
ography, and an adequate index. The book is therefore the necessary desk
manual for all those concerned with the legal aspects of this important business.
I do not wish to dismiss it,* however, as being merely the competent legal
tool which it is. A word should be said of the broader aspects of the accom-
plishment which this work signalizes. For here is the culmination of a suc-
cessful laboratory experiment in social research leading to governmental action
with important results. The rapacity of the loan shark has been proverbial,
but for generations we did nothing about it except to forbid usury. This did
not lessen the economic need, but made its satisfaction more expensive by
driving the business underground. As a competent commentator puts it, the
"most obtrusive characteristic of American money lending in the nineteenth
century and the early years of the twentieth was its illegality."' This situa-
tion can be traced to the failure of American states generally to repeal their
old usury laws, restricting lawful interest on loans to a maximum of 6, 8
or occasionally 10 per cent a year. Beginning in 1907, however, the Russell
Sage Foundation sponsored competent and authoritative research in this field.
From 1916 on it has recommended successive drafts of a Uniform Small Loan
Law. As it happens, the author and his father have been connected with
most of the legislation and much of the litigation in this field in their capacity
as counsel for a small loan company; and the author has been chairman .for
ten years of the law committee of the American Association of Personal
Finance Corporations. The consequence of the research and of the public
agitation for protection of the small borrower is that thirty-three states2 now
have legislation regulating the industry along lines for the most part either
directly following or similar to those pointed out by the research. The busi-
ness is one of the most strictly regulated industries in the country; indeed
some say it is the most strictly regulated. Nevertheless it has grown and
prospered, while supplying a real social need. The story is a thrilling and
a satisfying one. It is a case study of research productive of results of
governmental action which has protected the needy, and at the same time
benefited the business itself by directing it along respectable and legal lines.
1. May, Small. Loans (1934) 14 E-,cyc. Soc. Scm.Ecxs 105, 107.
2. Including the District of Columbia and Hawaii.
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Perhaps other industries prone to despise academic research and to resist
public control might gain by a study of this history.
CHARLES E. CLARICt
New Haven, Conn.
THE FEDERAL DEATH TAX. By John E. Hughes. Chicago: Callaghan & Co.,
1938. Pp. xiv, 519.- $10.00.
PLINY the younger has been credited with the complaint that a death tax
is an unnatural exaction since it augments the grief and sorrow of the be-
reaved.1 Although Mr. Hughes professes at the outset to "favor an Estate
Tax" on the usual social grounds,2 he later betrays such an animus towards
the tax, at least in its present form, as to make Pliny's disapproval seem mild
indeed.3
That the author writes from a "point of view" is, of course, entirely proper
and tends to impart color to the book where it might otherwise be flat. But
to the extent that it lacks objectivity, its usefulness as a guide to the future
is necessarily impaired. Thus, Mr. Hughes defends 4 at length the decision in
Bowers v. Commissioner, 90 F. (2d) 790 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937), where the
court had plainly departed from established principles. Shortly after publi-
cation of the book, that decision received the most crushing blow that can
be dealt by the Supreme Court, namely, a per curiant reversal.5 But even
though it frequently plays the role of the advocate, rather than that of the
scholar, this volume will be helpful to counsel seeking support for their posi-
tion in litigation.
The book contains much that is useful. It could hardly be otherwise when
viewed against the broad background of the author's rich practical experience
and in the light of the rigorous standards which he set for himself in its
preparation. 6 There are fourteen chapters, one of which deals with the gift
tax. The first chapter contains a concise history of Federal death tax legis-
tDean and Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
.1. See SHuLTz, TAXATION OF INHERITANCE (1926) 6.
2. See Pp. iv-v.
3. See Pp. 45-47.
4. Pp. 71 et seq.
5. Helvering v. Bowers, 303 U. S. 618 (1938).
Similarly, the author quite plainly attempts to prove that the Joint Resolution of March
3, 1931 [c. 454, 46 STAT. 1516 (1931)], is unconstitutional [pp. 174-1781, and here again
publication was followed by a unanimous decision of the Supreme Court reaching the
contrary conclusion. Helvering v. Bullard, 303 U. S. 297 (1938).
6. The Preface states that he "has read the briefs in every Federal Estate Ta\
case presented to the Supreme Court of the United States, many briefs in the Circuit
Courts of Appeal and Board of Tax Appeals, and has also read the recommendations of
the Treasury Department, Reports of the Committee on Ways and Means of the 1ouse
of Representatives, Reports of the Senate Finance Committee and the Debates in Con-
gress concerning each Estate Tax Law enacted by Congress and the amendments there-
to." P. iii.
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lation and a brief outline of the structure of the present law. The second and
third chapters are not confined to the estate tax, but are concerned generally
with the constitutional scope of the Federal taxing power and rules for inter-
preting tax statutes. It is in that discussion of constitutional questions that
the book is probably weakest. The comments are frequently superficial and
sometimes misleading.7
The next three chapters deal with the heart of the estate tax, namely, what
is included in the gross estate. The treatment of deductions in chapter VII
is adequate, although here, as in other fields of taxation, the hazards of rapid
obsolescence at the hands of the Supreme Court after publication are strik-
ingly revealed.8 Chapter VIII consists of a thorough discussion of valuation
of property for estate tax purposes and has an astoundingly exhaustive ap-
pendix which classifies the decisions in accordance with the type of propearty
involved. The next five chapters-dealing with rates of tax, duties of the
executor, administrative and procedural matters, and problems affecting
estates of non-resident aliens-pr ceed in a conventional, if somewhat per-
functory manner. A final chapter, which treats of the gift tax, does not con-
tribute very much over and above a mere restatement of the statutory pro-
visions and the Treasury regulations.
While the book on estate taxes remains Yet to be written, Mr. Hughes'
volume nevertheless represents a distinct contribution. Perhaps it may be an
impossible or futile task to attempt a definitive treatise on this subject. In
any event, the constant outpourings of the courts with respect to the exist-
ing statute and the proposals for rather fundamental legislative changes in
the estate tax structure9 combine to make the task an uninviting one.
ARNOLD RAU. t
Washington, D. C.
PRICE AND PRICE POLICIEs. By Walton Hamilton and Associates. New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Co. 1938. Pp. xiii, 565. $4.00.
Tnis book is the report of a six-man exploring party into the greatest
present day frontier of American public policy. The operating characteristics
of seven major industries have been examined with price and price policies as
a point of departure. Such surveys should have been made long ago for every
major business, but the difficulty is that "arrangements which make up an
7. Thus, at page 9, note 5, appears the unqualified statement that ""he income tax
is a direct tax." But even the much criticized opinion in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 579 (1895), shows that it would be unwarranted to assume
that a tax on income derived from professional services is a direct tax.
8. Taft v. Commissioner, 304 U. S. 351 (1938), which was decided after publication
of the book, has already become a cornerstone of the law with respect to deductions.
9. See Statement of Roswell magill, the then Undersecretary of the Treasury, dis-
cussing a proposal to consolidate the estate and gift tax provisions. N. Y. Times, August
21, 1938, pp. 1, 15.
1 Special Assistant to the Attorney General of United States.
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industry can never be caught and imprisoned within the pages of a book;
usages are gone or remade before we can exhaust their actuality." For six
individuals to carry through such a survey of even seven major industries was
a tour de force. Recognition of its extent should be adequate coverage for
the limitations of the pictures presented. As the book is modestly described by
the principal author in the introduction "It exhibits only a few fragments from
the world of business . . . Persons in quest of a royal road to an under-
standing of how the whole economic order works must go elsewhere. Here
is set down no more than a prologue to American industry."
This book projects the fearless curiosity of a lawyer led through the fields
of economics into fact, in his search for tests as to what the public interest
really demands in regulation of industry. While Professor Hamilton is a
teacher of law, the gap between his profession and this work is bridged by
the anti-trust concept evolved by the courts--that there may lawfully exist
such animals as cooperative restraints of competition which are reasonable
and in the public interest, or at least not against the public interest. These
restraints are usually related to price. The first step in the quest for standards
of judgment as to when industries-in pricing or otherwise-are operating
in the public interest must be to find out how industry operates. But the
fact, emerging with startling force from a reading of this book, is that there
is no such thing as "industry". Rather, each industry is most distressingly
dissimilar in its major characteristics from other major industries. If the
study of industry now under way in Washington under the auspices of the
National Economic Committee should perform for each major industry the
task of exploration that has been begun by Professor Hamilton and associates,
the foundation for erection of standards and determination of public policy
would be laid. But in view of the fundamental dissimilarities between in-
dustries much wise thinking would remain after the laying of the foundation.
Assuming that price and price policies are understood at least for a single
industry, the problem remains of establishing devices of control consistent
with our constitutional law and the stubborn practical realities of that industry.
A device must not be too exclusively based on force of authority or it will
run afoul of both the constitutional law and the untractable facts. One of the
contributions of this book is the modest recognition of the necessity not only
for a practical means of raising serious industrial problems, but also for
caution in the experimental approach to their solution. It is submitted that
the field is so far from being understood, that the experimentation must involve
a very minor degree of coercion, either from the State or from recognized
industry agencies, or it will be impossible to avoid the type of breakdown
illustrated by the NRA prior to the Schechter case.
The authors point out that as a part of the continual shift of industries from
the competitive pattern to public utility status "It came to be questioned
whether the ideas from which the anti-trust acts were fashioned were the most
enduring stuff." Again, "A test of a public policy by reference to the facts
is difficult; there are far more accounts of how competition is supposed to
operate in general than of its actual performance in specific industries."
This book is the initial effort to meet the latter need. The selection of
industries for the start is interesting and justified by the results. The three
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majors at the top of the list supplement each other-the automobile, the
automobile tire, and gasoline. Public policy in connection with such industries
cannot be well considered unless it recognizes that in industries which depend
upon each other the effect of one price policy on supply and demand may be
practically, if not entirely, immaterial compared to the force of the activity
or inactivity of the other related industry. The next selection, cottonseed, is
a fascinating picture of a structure of joint products, oil, meal, hulls, and
linters, and the relation of costs and prices under such circumstances. Dresses,
one of our most important industries, where small units prevail and old-
fashioned competition might be expected to demonstrate its virtues, is shown
as a medley of customs, romantic notions, of untrained entrepreneurs, inse-
curities, rigidities, abuses and dilemmas. Whiskey and milk, the remaining
two industries, of course introduce new elements of public policy and accre-
tions of regulation, but the area affected by the public policy and the extremely
miscellaneous and accidental interrelations of differing public policies applied
to the same industry by states, cities and the Federal Government, are worthy
subjects for an entire book in themselves.
The insight of the authors into fundamental intangibles of the several in-
dustries is illustrated by their comments on the plight of the automobile
industry in time of depression. After observing that the drying up of demand
would bankrupt any industrialist "less munificently buttressed with cash sur-
pluses", they go on to point out that even with such surpluses the "going
would be difficult were not the manufacturer in a strategic position to distribute
the costs of adversity." The costs can, and as recognized by this approach,
must, be shifted "to other corporate units who can levy no demands upon
his treasury-to manufacturers of raw materials, whose charges represent
some 60 per cent of the wholesale value of the car; to laborers, for whom no
employment can be found and who therefore have no claim to wages. As a
result, the industry's disaster appears publicly in the garb of a deficit in the
purchase of steel, coal, machine tools; in the balance sheets of parts makers,
who go under quietly; in the losing race between income and outgo of the
dealer; in the shock of a lower living standard, which the laborer must take;
in the expenditures of the government for relief. Here are several grounds
of complaint, yet there is no personal villain in sight."
The authors' treatment of the tire industry recognizes the correlative effect
of concentration in related and dependent industries. Thus: "the great con-
centration in the automobile industry has produced an equal concentration
in the buying of tires." In this connection the importance of such intangibles
as the friendship between Firestone and Ford, the vital necessity of holding
a large contract to avoid destructive rearrangements and higher unit costs,
and the loss of prestige that would follow loss of an important contract, are
listed as background for the "bitter struggle" among the large tire manu-
facturers for contracts from automobile companies. "There is a competition
of giant business as well as of petty trade. It is quite fitting for the govern-
ment to insist upon a fair field and no favors among rival tradesmen. But
in its regulatory endeavors it should trim its sails to the winds of change that
blow; it should not attempt to impose the hypothetical norms of trust-busting
statutes upon an industry already overcompetitive. And it should not play
1938]
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favorites between rival forms of marketing, or, above all, put a premium upon
inefficiency."
One of the most interesting studies in the collection is the study of dresses
and, here again, the ordinary rules of orthodox economics seem to be of slight
importance in the exploration or description of what actually happens. The
importance of personnel, in an industry where style may be expected to rule
any program, overshadows all other considerations. Here, too, is exposed the
fallacy in the classical assumption that the operation of free competition may
be counted upon to move forward the welfare of the efficient and eliminate
the inefficient. Here, as elsewhere in less startling degree, the threat or
arrival of insolvency is more likely to engender a change in name than actual
disappearance of concerns, and "inefficient" concerns and individuals, far from
being eliminated by insolvency, return to the fray strengthened by freedom
from capital expenses borne by their competitors. This study is highly recom-
mended for sheer interest as well as for the light thrown on the operation
of one enormous segment of industry where the large concern is non-existent.
The final monograph by Professor Hamilton, entitled "The Politics of
Industry", broadens the book by a wealth of illustration from industries other
than the seven majors. While the lack of conformity between orthodox econ-
omic assumptions and the actual operation of the chosen seven industries
might seem a factor resulting from the choice, the references to other major
industries suggest that a broader survey would show departure from orthodox
theory to be the rule rather than the exception.
The kaleidoscope of price seems to leave little of simplicity conforming to
the romantic notion that price-making can be relied on as a simple regulator
to keep industry in order. To list the departures from the norm in price-
making takes Professor Hamilton page after page of almost index terseness.
Consider the important matter of the ever-shifting changes in make-up of
the good itself for which price is set. In many situations constant product
change may go on with little or no relationship to price change: "For many
commodities a conventional unit measurement has been established in the
likeness of a convenient coin. A bar of chocolate has through prosperity,
depression, and a business upturn remained true to its nickel; the accommo-
dation of the commodity to changing costs has been made in thickness-its
least visible dimension. A loaf of bread, so far as the eye can detect, may
retain its identity for months; yet slight additions or decrements of weight
make its fixed price a variable. . . . A Gillette razor blade has for thirty
years, except for an occasional lapse or a bargain offer, sold at 5 cents; but
in that period the blade has undergone constant modification. The price of
a well-known shoe has until recently stood foursquare against all the winds
of economic fortune, though the pairs that have carried name and price tag
present a slowly changing parade. Women's dresses have for years been
grooved into the same price lines. Yet at any moment the articles priced at
an identical figure may not have even a silhouette in common, and between
the garment of 1920 and that of current vintage lies a revolution in design
and taste. . . . In fact, a long catalogue of wares is beat upon too insistently
by taste and technology to yield the materials upon which statistics of price
may be firmly grounded."
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Many other variables are pointed out, such as the giving of premiums,
gratuities, varying guarantees, service, return privileges, etc. The moral:
"The distinction between flexible and inflexible prices must be accepted with
critical scrutiny; the stability of a price that seems to stand against the buffets
of a disorganized market may conceal breakdowns in other terms of the
bargain" and, "the function of price has less to do with the creation of demand
than with the disbursal of custom among competitors." Not only is assumed
rigid price to be taken critically, but flexibility may be a hoax in its pretense
of public protector. Consider farm products, bituminous coal, textiles, and
the building trades. "A flexible price has been unable to turn an advancing
technology to effective use, has aggravated the host of the unemployed, and
in its failures has created sources of further demoralization."
While they are in accord with most current observers that, in knowledge,
technique, and resource, human and material, the stuff of a greater abundance
is at hand, and therefore that we should grasp that greater abundance, the
authors should be listened to when they conclude: "If a new agency is to be
invoked against disorder it must be fitted to its office. . . . The state, with
the club of the criminal law, can never beat the behavior that attends the
pursuit of gain into accord with rigid norms. The quick staccato of industry
cannot be timed to the decorous processes of a legal procedure developed in
the days of petty trade. . . . A proper freedom of collective action, within
the strict limits of public interest, must be accorded agencies of business."
Of course, this means authority and control, both public and private. Some
may prefer the clock turned back. "But from authority it is too late now
to effect an escape. The sovereignty of the market is past; the political
controls are here and we must subdue them to the public interest as best
we can." Granting the inevitable, there is still a yearning for simplicity, but
the prophet does not hold out hope of simplicity and, as befits a prologue
which exposes an almost infinite variety of problems, exhorts only to base
exercised authority on adequate knowledge, "a suiting of policy to the industry,
and the contrivance of measures to meet the occasion." This is good advice.
BLACKWELL SMITHf
New York, N. Y.
AMERICAN FAMILY LAws, Vol. V, IN COMPETENTS AND DEPENDENTS. By
Chester G. Vernier, assisted by J. Rex Dibble and Richard A. Frank.
Stanford University Press, 1938. Pp. x.xxiii, 707. 16.50.
WITH this useful and interesting work, supplemented by another 1 which
brings the material in the five volumes up to date, Professor Vernier con-
cludes his monumental survey of the family laws of 51 American juris-
tMember of the New York Bar.
1. American Family Laws, 1938 Supplement, by Chester G. Vernier, assisted by
Richard A. Frank. Pp. mxii, 178. $3.50.
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dictions.2 The present volume, naturally, follows the plan of its predecessors.
Its four parts, dealing respectively with Infants, Aliens, Drunkards, and
Insaie Persons, are divided into sections, each of which contains a summary
of the relevant statutes, accompanied in some instances by a short discussion
of the case law and by brief critical comment; a table giving the content of
the statutes in each jurisdiction, or in some instances simply a list of statutory
citations; and a bibliography of pertinent legal literature, including law review
notes and comments. Federal statutes are not included, nor is non-legal liter-
ature.
In some instances 3 the omission of case materials and Federal statutes
and treaties 4 (to which, however, reference occasionally is made) necessarily
prevents anything like complete coverage of the matters in hand. It would
exhibit a gross lack of understanding to characterize these omissions as
regrettable in a work of this scope. For not since Stimson's American State
Law has the mass of state statutes in a sizeable legal area been gathered
together and interpreted in the light of a critical analysis of subject-matter.
Now, other students, possessing less ingenuity and painstaking scholarship,
can use Vernier's work in conjunction with their own investigations of more
accessible materials.
Volume V, as the Preface notes, does not fall strictly within the field of
family law but relates rather to the law of persons. Since traditionally the
two are studied together when the law of persons outside the family is studied
at all, few will quarrel with Professor Vernier's combination of subject-
matter. In some ways this final volume is more revealing than any of the
others, for most of the topics which it treats have not been dealt with to
any extent in previous literature and have received much less popular atten-
tion than marriage law administration, divorce, and the status of married
women, or even illegitimacy and non-support. Consequently this latest volume
will well repay a systematic examination. Various aspects of infancy, such
as apprenticeship, susceptibility to service of process, and minors' bank
deposits; the entire matter of the civil status of aliens; public provision for
the care of drunkards; and numerous specific regulations pertaining to the
capacity of insane persons, are dark corners of the law. It is important to
have light cast into them, both because of their social significance and because
of their occasional importance in individual affairs.
Especially valuable is Professor Vernier's assembly of materials relating
to insanity. Here it clearly appears that mental disorder is a matter of legal
concern in surprisifigly numerous connections and that statutory definitions
of "insanity", together with legal methods of determining its existence, are
utterly confused and unsatisfactory. It would be an incalculable boon if the
author's work were to stimulate legislative clarification and reform in this
vital matter.
2. The previous volumes are: I, INTRODUCTORY SURVEY AND MARRIAGE (1931),
Book Review (1932) 42 YALE L. J. 158; II, DIVORCE AND SEPARATION (1932), Book
Review (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 1001; III, HUSBAND AND WIFE (1935), Book Review
(1936) 45 YALE L. J. 742; IV, PARENT AND CHILD (1936).
3. See § 282, on emancipation.
4. See Part X, Aliens.
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American state legislation possesses, on the one hand, a variety that springs
both from its popular origin and from the multifarious nature of the life with
which it deals. On the other, it.possesses fragments of a scarcely-visible pat-
tern which gives ground for the hope that statesmanship may yet succeed in
producing an administrable system of law. Professor Vernier has laid bare
the variety of state legislation in family law and, at the same time, has
applied the magic chemical that has revealed the elements of its pattern. As




A REVIEW OF BooK REVIEWS
FEDERAL JUSTICE. By Homer Cummings' and Carl McFarland.2 New York:
The Macmillan Co., 1937. Pp. vii, 549. $4.00.
Federal Justice, subtitled Chapters in the History of Justice and the Federal
Executive, has fared well in the hands of reviewers in about thirty publications
of wide circulation or of scholarly or professional standing.3 In only one has
tWashington University School of Law.
1. Attorney General of the United States.
2. Assistant Attorney General of the United States.
3. Including the following hereinafter referred to in the text or notes: Marquette
Law Review, Herbert XV. Rice (April, 1937); Hartford (Conn.) Daily Times, Bulldey
S. Griffin (Jan. 9, 1937) ; Review of Reviews, Herschell Brickell (Feb., 1937) ; California
Law Review, Wendell Berge (May, 1937, Vol. XXV, No. 4); Boston University Law
Review, John D. O'Reilly, Jr. (June, 1937, Vol. XVII, No. 3); American Political
Science Review, J. A. C. Grant (April, 1937, Vol. XXXI, No. 2); Christian Science
Monitor, F. L. P. (Weekly Mag. Sec. Jan. 27, 1937); Springfield (Mass.) Republican
(Sunday, Jan. 31, 1937) ; Yale Review, Harvey C. Mansfield (Summer 1937, Vol. XXVI,
No. 4); Federal Bar Association Journal, John XV. Brabner-Smith (April, 1937, Vol.
III, No. 1) ; University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Fred P. Glick (April, 1937, Vol.
LXXXV, No. 6); Commonweal, William Franklin Sands (Feb. 19, 1937, Vol. XXVNr,
No. 17); New York Herald Tribune, Mark Howe, Jr. (New York Herald Tribune
Books, Sunday, Jan. 31, 1937); New York Times, Francis Brown (Jan. 11, 1937), and
see also New York Times Book Review, Charles Willis Thompson (Jan. 31, 1937);
Philadelphia Record, Ralph IV. Wescott (Jan. 5, 1937) ; News and Observer (Raleigh,
N. C.), Josephus Daniels (Mar. 7, 1937) ; Washington Daily News, H. L. (Jan. 5, 1937) ;
Georgetown Law Journal, Oscar A. Provost (M6fay, 1937, Vol. XXV, No. 4); American
Bar Association Journal, James Grafton Rogers (June, 1937, Vol. XXIII, No. 6);
Daily Journal of Commerce (Seattle), Chas. S. Albert (Mar. 17, 1937); New York
World Telegram, Herbert Little (Jan. 6, 1937) ; Chicago Daily News, Judge James H.
Wilkerson (Jan. 27, 1937) ; Bridgeport (Conn.) Sunday Post, Anne Whelan (Jan. 10,
1937); Time (Law, Feb. 1, 1937); Saturday Review, Charles Bunn (Feb. 6, 1937,
Vol. XV, No. 15, New York); Evening Star (Washington, D. C.), Rex Collier (Jan.
8, 1937) ; New York Post, Herschel Brickell (Jan. 13, 1937) ; Journal of Criminal Law
and Criminology, William Renwick Riddell (Sept.-Oct., 1937) ; Stamford (Conn.) Advo-
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the review been unfavorable. An independent appraisal is of course the
function of a reviewer. In this case, however, a survey of prior reviews is
of more than usual interest and throws light both upon Federal Justice and
the curious art of book reviewing. As an experiment, at least, the views of
these earlier reviewers-with no design to turn the tables to show the reviewers
reviewed-will serve as an introduction to the brief estimate of this reviewer.
The reviewers have characterized the contents of the volume in one or
both of two ways. They have listed the historical subjects or periods treated
in successive chapters of the book-the problems and methods of the Federal-
ists; the controversies of the Jeffersonian period; the struggle over the second
Bank of the United States in Jackson's time; the legal incidence of territorial
expansion; slavery, Civil War, and reconstruction; lawlessness in the far
West (and corruption in Washington) ; politics, business, and the western
railroads; extraordinary litigation over basic patents which have become the
symbol of American civilization; the sordid story of American prisons; the
development of federal detective agencies (recently a timely subject but given
a scant chapter); fraud and high scandal in the disposition of natural re-
sources; the legal sidelights on the World War; the development of a federal
criminal law; and the use of troops for law enforcement in times of peace.
Also they have emphasized the colorful story of the peculiar origins, growth,
responsibilities, and shortcomings of the officers of the Department of Justice
and their historical predecessors, the "progress of jurisprudence from the
earliest days in American political history,"' 4 the administration of federal
justice, or the development of the American constitutional system-as these
several themes "reflect the dominant tendencies of American life,"r' "mirror
the nation's growth," or affect or have been affected "by the life and times
of our people in each period of our national development."
On the whole, the volume has been found readable for lawyers and laymen
alike, as well as both nonpartisan and dispassionate--conclusions which have
come perhaps as somewhat a surprise, since the writings of public officers
are commonly suspect as dull and biased.8 The one unfavorable review, in
the New York Herald Tribune, adds to its other statements the observation
that, while "occasionally illuminating" but "never inspiring", the authors,
"like good lawyers", have plodded "with heavy foot-noted tread from one
topic to another"-though it speaks of the first chapters as "written with
discriminating intelligence" (other reviewers seem to prefer later chapters)
and the whole as "written with careful industry." James Grafton Rogers,
in the American Bar Association journal, concludes that "it is not for the
reading of him who runs." However, other reviewers, in both technical and
popular publications, find it not only readable but "interesting", "fascinating",
cate (Jan. 6, 1937). Of these, the review in the New York World Telegram is identical
with that in the Washington Daily News, and the review in the New York Post is an
adoption of the one in the Philadelphia Record.
4. Christian Science Monitor.
5. New York Herald Tribune.
6. Time Magazine.
7. California Law Review.
8. See opening paragraph of review in New York Times for January 11, 1937.
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"entertaining", "absorbing", "suitable for evening reading", "exciting", "vital",
"colorful", "clear and simple" in style, "notably devoid of the obfuscations
of legal phraseology and ideology", "meaty", the product of "gifted pens",
and, in the words of Francis Brown in the New York Times, a book which
"despite its forbidding title contains wit, humor and good English prose".
Mr. Justice Riddell, of the Supreme Court of Ontario, in the Journal of
Criminal Law and Criminology, speaks of it as a "handsome" and "charming
volume" which "must be read to be appreciated . . . Oh! si sic omnia:'
Few of the reviewers suggest any bias or partisanship in the volume. The
hostile reviewer in the New York Herald Tribune deplores as "unpardonable"
the omission of chapters on the scandals of the Harding administration and
the legal difficulties raised by prohibition, and concludes, somewhat irrele-
vantly, that "apparently Democratic devotion to Federalism has become so
passionate that discussion of the corruption of Republican officers of the
Federal government must be suppressed." The Commonweal review echoes
this thought on Federalism more searchingly and in less bitter words, while
the Marquette Law Review mentions the omissions as merely "minor defects
in an admirable survey". However, these omissions were undoubtedly deliber-
ate. The authors may have had in mind that these subjects had recently been
given much attention in the press and elsewhere, would require a great deal
of space, might seem to be an unfair emphasis on the less favorable aspects
of the work and problems of recent administrations of another political faith,
and could therefore be eliminated without affecting the essential story. It
should be noted that both subjects are touched upon. The earlier background
of the land and oil scandals is developed, and the position of prohibition in
the development of federal criminal law is sketched.
The Seattle journal of Commerce sees "an occasional tendency to slam the
Supreme Court and not to hold John Marshall as sacrosanct as the legal
fraternity in general is wont to do", Time Magazine finds an "emphasis and
appreciable New Deal bias" placed on some of the "references by Presidents
and great U. S. legalists to the Constitution and the Supreme Court", the
New York Times discerns "a readiness to bear down on men who were in-
dined to favor unduly business or financial groups", and the American Bar
Association journal perceives that "here and there the interpretations of events
are tinged a little with current political views" but suggests, later, that the
chapters "on the various epochs of legal warfare between the government and
successive groups of private enterprises are the most interesting in the book."
Other reviewers find the volume dispassionate, carefully avoiding partisan-
ship or propaganda, and written "with rare good taste.""
As might possibly have been anticipated, and despite 'Mr. Cummings' care-
fully explanatory and explicit introduction and acknowledgments, there is a
curious issue raised by some of the reviews in respect to the authorship of
the book.'0 But no reason appears for believing that the acute understanding
9. California Law Review; Hartford (Conn.) Daily Times; American Political
Science Review; Georgetown Law Journal; Chicago Daily News; Bridgeport (Conn.)
Sunday Post; Federal Bar Association Journal; Stamford (Conn.) Advocate; News and
Observer (Raleigh, N. C.); Daily Journal of Commerce (Seattle).
10. Seattle Journal of Commerce; New York Times; American Bar Association
Journal; New York Herald Tribune; The Yale Review.
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displayed in the book of the types of legal problems which reach the Attorney
General, and of the difficulties encountered in answering them, and the acute
understanding and clear account of the inter-departmental struggles and
political pressures to which the Department of Justice and the Attorney
General are unavoidably subjected have come from others than Mr. Cum-
mings and Mr. McFarland, who have personally and officially experienced
these struggles and pressures.
If style is a criterion, the volume is undoubtedly the work of Mr. Cum-
mings and Mr. McFarland. To one who has read with care even a part of
their previous individual writings, in innumerable instances there are to be
found combined in Federal Justice the smooth running, rhythmic prose of
Mr. Cummings and the thoughtful provocative inexplicities of Mr. McFarland.
In the last analysis, however, the authors should regard the doubts as to
authorship as flattering, for their basis would seem to be that Federal Justice
is far too good a book for public servants to have written, even in an admin-
istration which seems to produce many books and which shows a distinct
partiality for scholarly (perhaps at times in the eyes of some, too scholarly)
administrators.
While the reviews differ somewhat-and conceivably might have varied as
widely as the personalities and interests of the reviewers--they indicate a
surprising agreement. Federal Justice has very properly fared well in the
hands of the reviewers in respect both of the rather extraordinary number
of reviews and the very large majority which comment with favor, some with
very good favor, upon the book. It was a great undertaking, well done. No
one before had comprehended the possibility of such a book or dared to
attempt the gargantuan task, both personal and supervisory, of assembling
and classifying the materials, and then analyzing and writing about them.
The volume is a great service to history, to the science of government, and
to democracy. Especially is it a service to democracy because one cannot
read it without a thankful appreciation of the fact that democracy, clumsy
and inefficient in some aspects as it is, is so only as the incidental price of the
great virtues of freedom, and that democracy, though it lumbers in its
motion, lumbers inevitably forward.
HAROLD M. STEPHENSt
Washington, D. C.
AMERICA ON RELIEF. By Marie Dresden Lane & Francis Steegmuller. New
York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1938. Pp. 180. $2.00.
THE success of democracy depends upon widespread understanding of the
functioning of its institutions. It is highly desirable, therefore, that a large
audience should be secured for a book dealing with those new institutions
in the field of public assistance which have come into existence during the
present decade. The great expansion of legislation in the spheres of social
tAssociate Justice of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
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welfare, social insurance, and unemployment relief increases the timeliness
of this discussion of the evolution of the relief set-up since 1933, of the relief
problems presented by specific groups, such as women, white-collar workers,
and young persons, and of the unmet needs of certain groups of the relief
population. The authors' treatment is fundamentally sympathetic but there
is criticism of particular policies and methods. Criticisms of the present work
program arise principally out of the conviction that it has been a mistake for
WPA to swing "far away from the social workers who ran the FERA, far
away from social work technique in relief."
The social worker's attitude is revealed, for instance, in the authors' con-
tention that there is no justification for the payment of a security wage to
artists, musicians, and theatre workers higher than that paid to carpenters,
painters, and electricians. "From the viewpoint of need, it would be difficult
to build a case for special treatment of this particular group of workers over
and above other groups." This attitude disregards an underlying principle of
the security-wage schedule-that all WPA employees shall not be reduced
indiscriminately to the same dull, basic level of need. On the contrary, it
is the purpose of the WPA to render the conditions of employment as nearly
like regular employment as possible (within the obvious limitations imposed
by the fact that this public employment will be confined to the period during
which private employment is not available). Unless WPA employees are
able to regard their jobs as genuine employment, the benefits of work over
the dole can hardly be realized. Accordingly, differential wages are paid, not
only according to variations in living costs and local prevailing hourly wage
rates, but also according to the training and qualifications necessary for the
assigned job and according to prevailing estimates of the social value of the
contribution made.
The book fails to emphasize that the American preference for work instead
of a dole is founded largely on the fact that every man's activities are normally
organized around a job. Our habits and thinking are shaped by the fact that
the economic head of a household has some sort of employment. When the
rewards of work are regarded from a social point of view, such factors as
social status and mental satisfaction are hardly less prominent than the wages
received.
The authors are critical of the failure of existing relief programs to incor-
porate vocational training programs to a greater extent, notably for unskilled
workers and youths without work experience. Concededly, a more effective
organization of the labor market is desirable. Perhaps this improved organ-
ization should include job-training as well as job-placement. In this con-
nection, however, an obvious fact is often lost sight of: unemployment exists
predominantly because of a shortage of jobs and not because trained workers
are lacking for available jobs. The authors also criticize the Federal Govern-
ment for turning its back on the health problem. There is widespread agree-
ment that this is a major field where Federal action is not only urgently
required but highly probable. Present planning and future action have as a
point of departure the very comprehensive National Health Survey undertaken
during the winter of 1935-36 by the Department of Public Health with WPA
funds, the findings of which are now becoming available in printed form.
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The authors conclude their study with the recommendation that: "what
is at present a work relief program should be transformed into a Federal
employment program, divorced administratively from any Federal relief organ-
izations which might exist. It should offer genuine employment on projects
of material or cultural value, suited to the capabilities of the workers and
related to the functions of the permanent departments of the government
. . . Eligibility for such work should be based not on the worker's need
but on his skill . . . When, after a worker's period of insured unemployment
is exhausted, there is still no opening in his own occupation, the employment




tAssistant Administrator, Works Progress Administration.
